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A social analysis of an elite constellation: the case of Formula 1 
 
1: Introduction  
From its inception in the early 20th century thinking of Pareto, Michels and Mosca, elite 
theory has focused fundamentally on its political connections and dynamics (Woods 1998; 
Scott 1982; 2008). In this way, the term elite blended into that of the ‘ruling class’, and the 
fundamental question for researchers studying elites was the extent to which their existence 
challenged democratic and pluralist politics. It was in this spirit that C. Wright Mills (1956) 
couched his famous critique of the ‘power elite’. It is also in these terms that John Scott has 
adopted Weberian perspectives to insist on the significance of ‘command’ for delineating 
elites, thus differentiating them from social classes. Pierre Bourdieu’s (1985, and see 
Hjellbrekke et al 2011; Flemmen 2012; Denord et al 2011) conception of ‘fields of power’ 
also insists on the way that elites are defined through their capacity to mobilise exclusive 
networks. This approach led methodologically to an emphasis on elite power networks, and 
to the enduring persistence of elite formations who interlock through their social capital. 
Over the past 10 years, and influenced in particular by Savage and Williams’s (2008) call for 
a renewal of elite studies, the focus has shifted towards the more dynamic world of financial 
elites. Here, elite theory draws on the growing interests in the ‘super rich’ (Irvin 2008; 
Volschoa and Kelly 2012; Burrows 2013), the ‘one percent’ (Dorling 2014; Stiglitz 2011), 
and the ‘global capitalist class’ (Sklair 2003). Theoretically, the implication is that older 
forms of elite analysis might overstate the coherence and consistency of elite power 
networks, such as those embedded in interlocking corporate directorships (Froud et al 2008). 
It is sometimes the limits of elite co-ordination which is the focus of attention (e.g. Engelen et 
al 2012). This current picks up on the recent theoretical insistence that neo-liberal economic 
forces can be effective even in the absence of conscious mobilising and networking amongst 
distinctive power elites.   
The analysis of elites therefore now oscillates between those arguing for the power of neo-
liberal, financial elites against those reinstating the significance of elite social networks and 
the remaking of ‘power elites’. Owen Jones’s (2014) recent restatement that there is an 
‘Establishment’ in Britain is an arresting restatement of the older perspective. The aim of our 
paper, using a detailed case study of the Formula 1 industry, is to argue that we need to 
broaden to a ‘social analysis’. Although the significance of political and financial elites is not 
in doubt, we also need to recognise a wider ‘elite constellation’. We should not categorise 
elites as singular or unitary phenomena, but identify the co-existence of a range of different 
elite agents. In the case of F1, we argue for the power of a distinctive ‘technical elite’ which 
is the product of a long history of craft, skill, and technical expertise (see more broadly, 
Savage 2010). This allows us to recognise that elites are complex social formations which 
straddle different arenas, and we wish to bring the technical elements more fully into play so 
that they can more effectively intersect with the role of finance and politics.  
This argument about elite constellations is not simply insisting on complexity. It also directs 
us to theoretically insist that time and temporality is central to elite formation. In a similar 
vein to Cresswell’s (2010) notion ‘constellations of mobility’ in his discussion of movement 
and place, we stress the importance of tracing the impact of the past on the present, historical 
and geographical specificity, and attention to forms of immobility. Older political 
conceptions of elites emphasise the persistence of upper class networks, whereas newer 
financialised approaches tend to see elites as the product of contemporary neoliberal 
capitalism. We argue that the F1 technical elite is neither simply the product of recent neo-
liberal financialised capitalism, nor marked by long term elite persistence. Drawing on the 
arguments of Bourdieu and Piketty, we will argue that they are embedded within a long-term 
process of accumulation which is distinctive to the F1 engineering industry.  
Our paper proceeds by outlining why F1 offers an unusual – but strategically essential – 
vantage point for thinking about elites more generally. We then consider theoretically how 
we build temporality into our understanding of the formation of elite constellations, through 
our analysis of accumulation. We show how the F1 industry itself embeds a distinct model of 
accumulation in which extreme speed and intensity is dependent on prior temporal accretion. 
This metaphor directs us to move away from the superficial world towards a deeper and 
longer term understanding of elite constellations. In the final part of this paper we report a 
systematic analysis of the F1 technical elite, based on an exhaustive study of senior figures 
within the teams. We show how this group forms a distinctive technical, engineering and 
meritocratic elite – yet which is also exclusive and deploys powerful elite practices.  
Our study is based on a detailed reading of key sources relevant to the F1 industry, and the 
construction of a database on the chief engineers, managers and directors in six British F1 
teams. The teams themselves vary in size, organisational structure and position titles, which 
means the identification of the most senior members is not straightforward. To avoid 
potential selection bias, we used the names presented as senior management by the teams 
themselves in their official websites. With the exception of one team which has no such 
section (Lotus F1), the teams list between 6 and 10 senior management figures each. 
Typically, though the designation varies, these are positions such as Team Principal; 
Founder; Chairman; CEO; Deputy Team Principal; Chief Operating Director Officer; 
Technical Director; Sporting Director; Chief Designer; Director of Engineering; Team 
Manager. In addition to the 43 individuals derived this way, seven other recent and renowned 
employees were included on the grounds of their importance to and seniority within the 
industry, the wealth of data available, and on the condition that they had left the team no 
earlier than 2012. The status of the industry and of many of the teams’ senior management 
allowed data to be collected in the public domain, through the biographies on the teams’ 
websites, in media publications and the website LinkedIn. Information was collected on 
position; age; nationality; place of birth; schooling; university education; degree subject; 
number of years in F1; career progression; salary and hobbies and interests. This extensive 
prosopographical data base was cross checked (where possible) from a range of different 
sources.   
 
2: Formula 1 as a critical case study 
Formula 1 is a critical case study because it is a hugely successful part of the British 
economy, valued at £6.3 billion to £8.2 billion (Allen 2015; Sylt 2014).1 Over the past 15 
years, the industry’s total revenue has reached £11.1 billion, surpassing the £9.9 billion of its 
closest rival the FIFA World Cup of soccer (Sylt 2015). The total annual spending of all 
teams in 2015 was estimated at £1.9 billion, an average budget of £194 million (Walthert 
2015). Revenue in 2013 was £1.16 million and profit was £308 million (Sylt 2014). F1 
directly employs 6,000 people, who in turn work with a large network of motorsport suppliers 
– the Williams team used 3,000 UK companies alone in a six year period (Heaton 2011). 
These suppliers are also typically based in the UK Motorsport Valley Business Cluster of 
outer south-east England, which in 2013 comprised 4,500 companies employing a minimum 
of 41,000 people, with an annual turnover of £9 billion. Motorsport Valley is ‘a major source 
of value-added to the British economy’ with an average R&D spend of over 25% of turnover, 
‘dwarfing even the UK Pharmaceutical and IT industries’ (MIA Review 2013). Certainly in 
terms of its ratio of reward to size, the F1 sector therefore compares in its sheer economic 
prosperity with any other, including banking. 
 
What kinds of elite formation are embedded in FI? Despite the roots of motor racing in upper 
class culture epitomized by the gallant driver, it directly exemplifies the decline of the old 
fashioned, languid, gentlemanly elite associated with the power of top private schools and 
Oxbridge, with its Bullingdon Club and Downton Abbey-esque connotations. Fifty years ago, 
‘gentleman drivers were the rule’, exemplified by former 1970s F1 champion and television 
pundit, James Hunt, educated at Wellington College and son of a successful stockbroker 
(Arthur 2002 in Ciolfi & Stuart 2013). Hunt milked this playboy image to the full, 
womanizing and partying, and even playing the part of English eccentric to the point of 
dining with his pet German Shepherd dog at expensive Mayfair restaurants. However, Hunt 
retired in the 1970s and the last blast of this image was Johnny Dumfries, Seventh Marquess 
of Bute, who won the 24 hours Le Mans race in 1988 and remains on the Sunday Times Rich 
List with a net worth of £110 million. But he hardly exemplifies F1 today.   
 
By contrast, there is a clear warrant for the significance of finance, most notably through the 
key figure of (recently ousted) Bernie Ecclestone, the current CEO of Formula One Group 
and business magnate, who has played the key role in placing F1 on the global stage (Ciolfi 
& Stuart, 2013). In 2016 Forbes listed him as the 435th richest man in the world, with a net 
worth of $3.8 billion (£2.6 billion), down from $4.8 billion (£3.3 billion) in 2013 (“The 
World’s Billionaires” 2016). This put him as the 33rd richest Briton in the 2015 Sunday 
Times Rich List. The website BornRich.com details his 176 foot superyacht, luxurious Swiss 
ski resort and 15 bedroom house in Kensington, which remained unoccupied until sold for 
£57 million in 2004 to Indian steel tycoon Mittal. He is a classic case of the ‘working rich’, 
and a long way from being part of a hereditary elite class. Born in Suffolk in 1930, the son of 
a trawler skipper, his working-class family moved to Bexley Heath in south-east London in 
1938 (Lovell 2009). Ecclestone left state school at 15 having failed all his exams except 
maths (Bower 2011: 17). He was nonetheless admitted to Woolwich Polytechnic in 1946 to 
study physics and chemistry, where he spent much of his time pursuing his hobby of 
motorbike racing and left at 16 (Bower 2011: 17). Ecclestone developed his side venture 
trade of motorcycle spare parts into a dealership, expanding into real estate and loan 
financing while pursuing his interest in a range of motorsports. Initially as a driver in 
Formula 3, Ecclestone moved into F1 in roles as manager, team owner and commercial rights 
holder over a 60 year involvement with the sport (Ciolfi & Stuart 2013).  
F1 also appears to be highly contemporary in exemplifying the unleashing of an elite 
‘libidinal economy’. This idea, drawing on Lyotard’s reworking of Deleuze and Guattari, 
focuses on the liberation of new libidinal intensities, capitalism’s machinic capacity to 
unleash and satisfy desire. This idea has been elaborated by Nigel Thrift through reflections 
on how contemporary ‘knowing capitalism’ proliferates a world of ‘glamour’ (Thrift 2005; 
2008). F1 is massively vested in the proliferation of desire and fantasy, ranging from the 
presentation of the cars through to the display of glamorous female models on the Grand Prix 
circuits. This deportment of glamour extends back to the factories themselves. The suspended 
glass walkways and clean lines of the McLaren Technology Centre in Woking, Surrey were 
designed by Norman Foster, allegedly costing in the region of £300 million (“Queen opens 
new McLaren facility” 2004). The industry’s quiet professionalism and earnest passion for 
technical skill accepts this glamour of the spectacle as part of its history and its future as a 
business in the attraction of corporate sponsors. 
‘The job of F1 is to help develop the technologies, as with the V6 programme, so that 
we can benefit the whole economy through the manufacturers….. I think F1 – and 
maybe I'm a bit of a dinosaur – is a celebration of excess. We have the most powerful 
engines, we have the best show in motor racing, we have the best parties and the 
prettiest girls and we should not lose that. We are a show at the end of the day and the 
show must be maintained.’ (Bob Fernley, Deputy Team Principal at Sahara Force 
India, FOTA transcript 2011) 
We fully recognize the significance of finance, and glamour, in the success of F1. However, 
we want to contest that these themes are adequate. These images of elite-ness are simplistic, 
dated visions which do not apply to the industry in a straightforward way, nor do they 
adequately allow us to understand the industry as an elite constellation. Instead, we argue for 
the need to recognise the significance of a distinctly ‘technical elite’. This allows us to go 
behind the superficial imagery and media saturated stories of specific individuals or 
glamorous sites to recognize the power of an elite habitus which is a major part of the 
industry. In the next part of this paper, we theoretically sketch out what this argument entails.  
 
 3: The formation of elite constellations: accumulation, embodiment and labour 
Our approach to elite constellations argues against for the co-existence of different elite 
motifs and does not conflate elites with a distinctive occupational profile, income boundaries 
(such as the 1%), or a set of ascriptive characteristics. We see elite formation as part of a 
longer term historical process in which its boundaries with a more privileged professional and 
managerial middle class are porous and pliable. We avoid a language of demarcation and 
clear boundaries, and instead understand process and dynamics which need to be unravelled 
over time. Our starting point is Bourdieu’s argument:   
The social world is accumulated history, and if it is not to be reduced to a 
discontinuous series of instantaneous mechanical equilibria between agents who are 
treated as interchangeable particles, one must reintroduce into it the notion of capital 
and with it, accumulation and all its effects. Capital is accumulated labour (in its 
materialized form or its ‘incorporated,’ embodied form) which, when appropriated on 
a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to 
appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor. (Bourdieu 1986: 241) 
In pursuing this argument, Piketty’s emphasis on the longer term gestation of capital is a vital 
intervention (see also Savage 2014; Piketty 2014b). Understanding social classes as the 
product of capital, as forces in the process of ‘becoming’, as dependent on prior investment, 
provides a more sophisticated way of explicating elites as a dynamic and mutable force. This 
point leads us to refuse the conventional economists’ standard distinction between returns to 
capital and labour and reifying them into distinctive social classes (e.g. Wright 2014). 
Heuristically, Piketty, within the spirit if not the letter of Bourdieu, ambitiously prefers to see 
returns to capital as linked to accumulated historical return and returns to labour as linked to 
current activity (see generally Savage 2014). As labourers, we have to go out to work each 
day afresh – we cannot rest on our laurels 2 . Returns to (economic) capital however 
accumulate on an historical basis, and it is this longer term accumulation which is central for 
elite formation.  
This moves away from the standard sociological move of seeing elites largely in terms of 
their social and political ascribed characteristics in which it is their social networks, their 
membership of particular families, clubs, and so on which constitute them as elite. It also 
avoids the tendency to treat them simply as the reflexes of contemporary neo-liberal 
capitalism, as if there is no longer term history implicated in the in	 the	 formation	 of	 elites	 and	
economies	 of	 glamour. By contrast, a concern with accumulation allows us to explore the 
complex dynamics of the accumulation process avoiding the categorical separation of people 
into different camps, and which more effectively renders elites as agents of change. Piketty’s 
analysis of economic capital shows how those with more to invest earn higher rates of return 
than those with less to invest. There is thus a structural process, which he shows most directly 
with respect to the endowments of American elite universities which allows those who have 
most, to gain most, not only in absolute but also in relative terms. We can thus see how 
reward and advantage can be built into the organisation of markets and fields and come to 
have striking outlier effects at the top end which permit those at this top end to enjoy 
‘Matthew effects’ where ‘to those who have, more shall be given’ (see Ingham 2005, and 
more generally Savage et al 2015).  
It is vital to detach our argument about accumulation from economistic logics of ‘investment’ 
which imply an individualistic frame of reference. This includes standard arguments about 
the significance of ‘human capital’ which is the most usual way of justifying privilege from 
within a neo-classical economic framing. Both Piketty and Bourdieu join forces in resisting 
this argument because they see it as assuming that individual motivation, skill, hard work and 
endeavour is solely responsible for wealth. For Piketty, the ‘human capital hypothesis’ is 
‘largely illusory’.  
There is little evidence that labor’s share in national income has increased 
significantly…. ‘nonhuman’ capital seems almost as indispensable in the 21st century 
as it was in the eighteenth or nineteenth. (Piketty 2014: 22)  
Although Piketty is not a Marxist, his Marxisant refusal to use the concept of human capital 
and his preference for delineating ‘labour’, and above all his concern with temporality, is 
telling. Bourdieu (1986) makes a similar move in focusing on cultural, rather than human 
capital. Because cultural capital exists in three related forms, embodied, objectified, and 
institutionalised, he thus resists seeing it as a purely a self-investment and draws attention to 
the wider context in which cultural capital can be activated into producing advantages.  
Here, the arguments of the German Marxists Kluge and Negt (2015) have considerable 
resonance, as they are conducting an exercise for labour which parallels Piketty’s for capital, 
in drawing attention to the power of the past over the current.  In their interpretation of Marx 
‘the bulk of dead labour in a modern society is superior to living labour’ (Kluge and Negt 
2015: 129). Labour as a process is therefore embedded in past routines, in which passion, 
materiality, personality and technique come together. As Fore (2014 23-24) put it, ‘human 
capital for Negt and Kluge is an unstable assemblage of dissimilar and often ill-fitting 
components, some flexible and some obstinate….. unlike the simple linear development of 
fixed capital, living labour power occupies multiple dimensions (sensory, intellectual, 
psychic, physiological), many of which are incompatible with one another… the labourer 
meets every abstract operation with a corresponding feat of concretion’ 
Patrick Joyce’s account of the formation of the civil service elite in Britain from the 19th 
century is an arresting exemplification. For Joyce this process involved the moulding of 
subjectivities and personalities through minute devices, ranging from the practice of writing 
and filing, through to the ritualistic bodily drills and routines imparted at private schools and 
the Oxbridge college. The British elite was therefore neither a gentlemanly residue nor a pure 
meritocratic formation but a distinctive assemblage implicated, in Bourdieu’s terms, in a 
distinctive elite habitus which could be historically persistent. 
It is in this spirit that we approach our F1 elite. As we have explained above, we do not think 
that the kind of gentlemanly habitus which Joyce excavates has such significance today. But 
we do not think either that characterising the industry’s leading figures as the product of neo-
liberal financialised capital is enough either. The historical plate has not been wiped entirely 
clean. We instead demonstrate how the F1 elite is an historical extension of a distinctive 
technical and engineering idiom which has also been an important feature of post war British 
social change more generally (Savage 2010). Standing in contrast to the gentlemanly world of 
professional expertise, these technical skills embraced cultures of skilled craft work alongside 
professional expertise and became increasingly instantiated into the practices of information 
technology and communication. Our argument will be that we can only understand the F1 
elite as the obstinate crystallisation of this technical ecology. 
     
4: Accumulation and the long durée in F1   
On the face of it, it may appear strange to claim that F1 is characterised by long periods of 
accumulation. It is renowned as an environment of turbulence, immediacy and extreme 
innovation. Media reports portray a world of short-termism and instability. The car itself 
symbolises this – it passes from being an idea in a designer’s head, through competition, to a 
museum piece within just 24 months (Department of Trade & Investment 2015). The pace 
and competitiveness of the industry, Jenkins and Floyd (2001) argue, ‘is represented by the 
fact that, in fifty years of competition, no team or driver has won the championship 
consecutively more than four times’ (Jenkins & Floyd, 2001: 949). Yet it is central to our 
argument that to see F1 in these terms only would be to miss the multiple long term processes 
of accumulation that not only underlie the industry, but are indeed the very bedrock of its 
constitution and continued success.  
 
Let us be clear. Financialisation was crucial to F1’s recent success, and Ecclestone was the 
key agent. The Formula One Group, which owns the commercial rights to F1, is made up of 
30 to 40 companies in multiple jurisdictions, for the most part the UK, Jersey, Luxembourg 
and Switzerland. The parent company of the group, Delta Topco, is registered out of Jersey. 
In 2001 Delta Topco’s subsidiary SLEC Holdings bought a 100 year lease on rights from 
F1’s governing body the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) (Sylt and Reid 
2012). Its controlling shareholder (35.5%) is a private equity firm called CVC Capital 
Partners. Expert on the machinations of F1 finance, Sylt (2014) reports that the CVC buyout 
of F1 in 2006 was driven by its co-founder Donald Mackenzie, known to be a racing fan, and 
was funded with two loans – The Royal Bank of Scotland provided £645 million whilst 
£566.3 million came from CVC's Fund IV (Sylt 2014). Since 2006 CVC has made £2.6 
billion from share sales and dividend payments, partly funded by a recapitalisation in July 
2014 which increased F1’s debt by £2.6 billion (Clancy 2014). This made it one of the private 
equity firm's best-performing investments. Although CVC ‘typically targets a three to five 
year investment holding period’, it held F1 for far longer than usual as a result (Sylt, 2014). 
With the term of the fund being 10 years, and concerns over Ecclestone’s role in the sport, 
CVC is considering selling its stake for somewhere in the region of $10 billion (£6.84 
million) in 2016. Along with CVC, other shareholders include American asset management 
firm Waddell & Reed (20.9%), and the estate of bankrupt investment bank Lehman Brothers 
(12.3%), the latter of whom has made almost $2 billion (£1.37 billion) from its investment in 
F1, a 550% return (Sylt 2014). 
 
Elsewhere, financialization has been associated with a neo-liberal drive to subject business to 
calculations based on short term ‘shareholder value’. Whilst these financialisation 
imperatives are real enough in F1, they should not decry the significance of longer term 
processes. Behind the complex and turbulent myriad of business deals lie long term, diverse 
temporal rhythms of debt circulation (Bear 2014), investment and 100 year leases (Sylt & 
Reid 2012). 
‘Even now, after the latest contracts, which have been signed up to 2020, the first thing 
any new shareholder says to me: it’s not enough. Can’t we make it a longer period? We 
don’t want the uncertainty.’ (Donald Mackenzie, CVC Managing Director in Sylt 2013) 
 
Team finances, in particular the inequitable reward system, are important to understand: this 
system is the root of the so-called ‘crisis of F1’ – that ‘in a sport with a turnover of more than 
$1.7 billion (£1.1 billion), and which generates very healthy profits for its commercial rights 
holders, smaller teams can’t make ends meet’ (Leggett 2014). In 2014, two of the smallest 
teams, Caterham and Marussia went into administration.  
 
The teams make money from different sources – sponsorship, merchandising, and in some 
cases from selling their expertise to others teams or other industries. However, their key 
income comes from prize money. The way this is distributed ensures that success on the race 
track translates into more prize money, as determined by Schedule 10 of the Concorde 
Agreement. Of the Formula One Group’s income, 63% is distributed to the teams. In 2013, 
this meant that out of $1.6 billion (£1.09 billion), $700 million (£479 million) went to the 
teams. From this, around 2.5% is deducted and goes directly to Ferrari, negotiated in 
recognition of the team’s historical importance to the sport. Ferrari thus gets £12 million 
automatically, leaving £467 million which is divided into two funds. One half is divided 
equally between the top 10 teams (approximately £24 million each), determined by their 
results over the previous three seasons. The other half is divided up on a sliding scale, 
dependent on where the team finishes in that season’s championship table. The winning team 
picks up around 20 percent of the prize fund – the higher up you finished in the constructors' 
championship, the more money you get (Benson 2014) On top of this there is a separate fund 
called the constructors' championship bonus (CCB), of approximately £198 million and split 
between the largest teams – Ferrari, Red Bull and McLaren, with Ferrari earning by far the 
most. In addition, the two other teams deemed historically important and who also have 
permanent places on the rule-making F1 strategy group – Mercedes and Williams – each get 
payments of around £20.5 million (Benson 2014). Table 1 approximates the amount each 
team received in prize money from the Formula One Group in 2013. 
 
Table 1: Formula 1 Prize money breakdown, 2013 
Team (ranked) Equal share ($M) Merit money ($M) Total ($M) 
1: Red Bull 34.12 64.85 98.97 
2: Mercedez 34.12 54.6 88.72 
3: Ferrari 34.12 44.4 96 (includes 
extra $17.5m 
4: Lotus 34.12 37.5 71.62 
5: McLaren 34.12 34.1 68.22 
6: Force India 34.12 30.7 64.8 
7: Sauber  34.12 23.9 54.12 
8: Toro Rosso 34.12 20.5 54.6 
9: Williams 34.12 17.1 51.2 
10: Marrusia None 13.6 13.6 
Caterham 34.12 None 34.12  
 
(derived from Arshad 2014) 
This system of prize money thus rewards not just merit, but merit over time and – moreover – 
the importance of historical relationships. The similarity of the prize money received to the 
















In essence, it means that the teams’ main source of income is premised upon a model of 
accumulation through time, which advantages the older, more successful and larger teams to 
the detriment, it is argued, of the smaller, less successful competitors. This income in turn 
prompts both future success and higher income from other sources, such as sponsorship and 
merchandise. Further to this, the increasing costs of technological advance in high-tech 
hybrid power units contributes to the ‘widening chasm between the haves and have-nots’ 
(Sylt 2014). The game, the smaller teams argue, is rigged (Oliver and Allen 2015). In 2015 
two teams, Force India and Sauber, lodged a complaint with the European Union about F1's 
governance and prize money distribution (Esler 2015). 
 
These long term rhythms in finance are centred on Motor Sport Valley, the home of F1, 
which is the spatial materialisation of temporal accumulation.  
When World War II ended, there were many aerospace engineers [in the area] who 
were used to building fast, lightweight airplanes to fight the enemy but no avenue for 
them to use their skills. There were also lots of flat airfields [used during the war], such 
as Silverstone, and not many cars left so the engineers needed to be inventive and 
started building lightweight cars to race on the airfields which became race tracks. That 
attracted those who wanted to race, and with them came suppliers who set up to fulfil 
their requirements. (Chris Aylett, CEO of the Motorsport Industry Association quoted 
in Barretto 2013) 
Today around 4,500 motorsport companies are based in Motorsport Valley, employing over 
41,000 people. This represents around 80% of the world's high-performance engineers 
(Bevan 2012). With six teams located within an hour of each other, it also means the best 
engineers can live in one place – ‘people can move teams very easily because they don't have 
to move house and home’ (Gary Anderson, technical analyst, quoted in Barretto 2013). 
 
Beyond its English heartland, in the global reaches of its Grands Prix locations, attention to 
the materiality and spatiality of the industry underscores the significance of the accumulation 
and immobility of infrastructure in F1. Since 1950, the F1 championship has taken place in 
70 circuits, of which 45 are permanent, purpose built race circuits, the others being street or 
road circuits. For the circuits involved in the 2014 championship, 58% have been in use for at 
least 25 years, 21% for 45 years, and with the oldest being the site of the Italian Grand Prix at 
64 years. New circuit contracts are set at ten years, with a combined total running cost over 
that period around $925 million (£632 million) (Sylt and Reid 2013).3 Construction costs are 
also huge. The Russian Grand Prix, held for the first time in 2014 at a road circuit in Sochi, 
cost $290 million (£198 million) to construct. This pales in comparison, however, to the $1.3 
billion (£888 million) Yas Marina race circuit opened in 2009 for the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix. 
Despite these sums, interest remains high, with the new Baku City Circuit, Azerbaijan 
debuting in 2016 and a second US Grand Prix in New Jersey under discussion (Sylt 2014). 
 
Looking closer at the industry, the production of speed itself is the result of long term 
accumulation. The industry is highly future-orientated, with careful long-term planning in 
terms of design and manufacture. Even in the midst of the economic downturn, motorsport-
based businesses spent 30% of their turnover on R&D to stay ahead of the competition, 
compared to 4% in engineering, 6% in automotive and 15% in pharmaceuticals (Barretto 
2013). Top teams can spend well over £68 million on research and development (Miller 
2013). Red Bull’s biggest cost in 2013 was R&D spending – £83 million, up 10% from the 
previous year. This represents 42% of their total budget of £197 million, the boost in their 
fortunes being the result of prize money awarded for the previous season (Sylt 2014). 
‘This sport is innovation, innovation costs money, a lot of investment, and long-term 
investment. So we keep investing in F1: that's our focus.’ (Marco Mattiacci, Ferrari 
team principal in Noble 2014)  
There is a distinctive long durée of planning in terms of R&D extending to five, even ten 
years. 
‘There are two worlds. You operate in the here and now ... everything in the run-up to 
the race will be based around being quicker at the track. But then equally all the teams 
are thinking of 2014, 2015, 2020. Every single detail is done on numerous levels.’ 
(Simon, F1 journalist) 
It is this long term temporal accumulation, intrinsically tied to financial accumulation through 
time, that creates speed and thus success. Thus ‘it takes a great deal more time and resource 
to design and make a car than it does to go and race it’ (Ladbrooke 2013). ‘Dead labour’ 
overpowers the short term present, and leaves a powerful imprint.  
 
Using a historical study of the F1 industry from 1950-2006, Jenkins (2010) argues that 
industries – and on the intra-industry level, teams – create and maintain competitive 
advantage through ‘dynamic capabilities’, and crucially, he argues, ‘sustaining capabilities’. 
Dynamic capabilities, typically associated with new entrants, allow quick adaptation to 
environmental shifts (such as technological innovation or regulation changes) to be used to 
their advantage against perceived sluggish, rigid incumbents. Over the long term, however, 
Jenkins argues that firms also need sustaining capabilities to remain competitive and to 
dominate. These sustainability capabilities are the accumulation of resources such as finance, 
brand position, knowledge of the industry and – we would add – expertise that provide a firm 
with the time and space necessary for them to reconfigure their resource base and to respond 
to change and new competitors. He shows that the large and oldest team Ferrari was able to 
remain in the top three constructors since 1950, despite many different technological regimes. 
While it was rarely able to adapt as fast or as easily as other teams, its sustaining capabilities 
– the strength of resources such as finance (from Fiat), the Ferrari brand, and its political 
skills in working with the regulatory body (the FIA) – allowed it to retain competitive 
advantage by ‘slow[ing] down the clockspeed of the industry relative to their own speed of 
change’ (Jenkins 2010).  
 
But whilst F1 is dependent on the long durée of planning and sustaining capabilities in R&D, 
funding and infrastructure, those in the industry attribute success and speed above all to the 
embodied expertise of its employees. As Solitander and Solitander (2010) argue, the fiercest 
competition is not on the track, but for the accumulation of knowledge and expertise. Some 
designers, as in the case of Adrian Newey, are considered so valuable that the teams will pay 
$10.2 million (£7 million) in salary for their services (FIA transcript 2007: 20).  
 ‘Back in the mid-’80s and ’90s you could prioritise the technology and just forget the 
people, and say the longer hours you work and the more work you did made you faster 
on the track. Those days are long gone. It’s all about the human and human 
development.’ (Dan, Technical Director) 
Accumulation of expertise derives from periods of higher education, experience in the 
industry, both in terms of lengthy careers in F1 or related industries and long hours on the 
job. Above all is reference to expertise as an accumulation of tacit knowledge, at the 
individual and team level. As Solitander and Solitander argue, ‘the tacit practices, the 
philosophy, routines (how things are done)’ are more important in F1 than ‘the explicit 
knowledge (what is done)’ and the strength of the technology (Solitander and Solitander 
2010: 46). Employees commonly speak of the long-term development and deepening of 
‘common sense’, ‘know-how’ and ‘instinct’ – an affinity for engineering and the sport.  
‘It's all about your overall gut feeling’ (John Barnard, Designer in Hamilton 2013) 
‘I see up-and-coming designers … having a lack of ability to analyse things from a gut 
feel, from experience ... I say to them “Look guys, this is wrong”.’ (Nigel Bennett, 
senior designer at Penske, quoted in Pinch and Henry 1999: 670) 
‘[It is not] one thing that makes a car go quicker, but a huge amount of small details and 
all the philosophy that has developed in a team over years’ (Pat Symonds, Chief 
Technical Officer at Williams, quoted in Solitander and Solitander 2010).  
This hard-won and time-worn form of tacit knowledge, on which scientific experiments and 
technical innovations often depend, Pinch and Henry (1999) argue, tends to emerge from 
‘sets of people who have undertaken long periods of apprenticeship and are integrated into 
networks of contacts’ (Pinch and Henry 1999: 673). 
Theoretically we can therefore see F1 as exemplifying how the production of rapid speed is 
dependent on prior investments – of funds, R&D resources, infrastructure, and human skill 
and expertise. We have a frame in which we can see how the capacity to reap rewards in the 
present is dependent on prior activity. It is actually premised on forms of immobility. The 
‘pulse’ of immediacy, of glamour and the libidinal part of a wider time ecology. It is through 
understanding the temporality of these accumulation processes that we can unravel how elites 
are not produced simply from contingencies but have a much longer process lying behind 
them. This is entirely consistent with Piketty’s emphasis on how capital, as the sum of 
historical processes of accumulation, always exceeds the present, and indeed increasingly so 
as the stock of capital builds up. Let us explicate this point by looking further at the specific 
characteristics of those in the most senior positions within F1 teams. 
 
5: The F1 ‘technical elite’ 
As a highly successful industry, the annual income levels of F1 employees are high, ranging 
from approximately £14,000 - £140,000 for mechanics and engineers; £270,000 - £6.8 
million for managers, chief engineers and directors, even leaving aside the special case of up 
to £22 million for drivers. With exact information hard to come by, the total spend on pay for 
the Red Bull team in 2009 was £45.9m across their 529 employees (Sylt & Reid 2011), 
making an average of £87,000 per employee.  
We have only been able to obtain information about the remuneration and/or worth of 
seventeen of these people in our database (see below). Though partial, a clear pattern 
emerges. Those who are Chairmen or Team Principals are usually multi-millionaires, or 
billionaires sometimes reflecting money made outside F1 (notably Mateschitz who made his 
fortune with the Red Bull drink, Mallya who made his in the liquor industry, and Lopez who 
is now in private equity), but on other occasions (as with Dennis, Horner and Williams) 
relying on money made inside the sport. Those doing technical jobs are less well paid, apart 
from Adrian Newey (who reportedly turned down a salary offer of £20 million to work for 
Ferrari) but even so fit very easily indeed into the top 1% of earners. The lowest confirmed 
salary we have found is for Wood, and this £200k is probably at the lower range of any in our 
database. In short, this is clearly a highly economically advantaged group. 
 
 
Name Team Title Reported salary/ worth 
Niki Lauda Mercedes Non executive director  Net worth £100 million 
Paddy Lowe Mercedes Executive director (technical) Salary alleged 1 million euros 
Ross Brawn Mercedes Former team principal 
(retired 2014) 
Net worth £100 million 
Dietrich 
Mateschitz 
Red Bull Chairman Net worth $10.7 billion 
Christian Horner Red Bull Team Principal Salary £2.1 million, net worth 
£7.5 million 
Adrian Newey Red Bull Chief Technical Officer Salary $10 million 
Frank Williams Williams Team Principal Basic salary £829k  (2011), 
net worth £106 million 
Mike O’Driscoll Williams Chief CEO Total compensation £469k 
Ed Wood Williams Chief Designer c. 200k 
Patrick Head Williams Former Director of 
Engineering (till 2012) 
£425k (2012) 
Adam Parr Williams Former Chairman till 2012 £357k (2009) 
Alex Burns Williams Former CEO till 2012 £333k (2009) 
Ron Dennis McLaren Chairman Worth $865 million 
Martin 
Whitmarsh 
McLaren Former CEO (till 2012) ‘Severance package’ $10 
million 
Sam Michael Maclaren Former technical director 
(until 2014) 
£469k (2009) 
Gerald Lopez Lotus Chairman and team principal ‘billionaire’  
Vijay Mallya Sahara Force 
India F1 
Team principal and 
managing Director 
Worth £750 million 
  
It is part of the self image of Formula 1 that its leaders have been self-made men. We might 
see this as the most recent incarnation of the Victorian Samuel Smiles ‘self-help’ ethos, as 
reworked with the assistance of 21st century technology. Thus, for Jenkins et al (2009), ‘they 
have learned through experience and the ‘school of hard-knocks’ and therefore they have 
tended to develop ad hoc practices for managing their organisations’ (Jenkins et al 2009: 
883). Table 2 reports our analysis of the career trajectories of the F1 elite. In one very 
important respect, the Samuel Smiles image is entirely intact. 49 out of the 50 names are 
men, and the only exception, Claire Williams, is the daughter of team founder Frank 
Williams. The masculinity of this elite remains unchallenged. We can also see that there are 
only seven senior figures (type 7) who have a business or finance background and have 
moved sideways into the industry without an engineering or technical background. In this 
respect, this is a largely in-house engineering elite, which is confirmed by other sources 
(Goodall and Pogrebna 2014). 
This image of being steeped in motor racing runs deep. The accounts for three figures give 
illustrations of this ethos. Andrew Murdoch, race engineer from Williams, is reported as 
follows 
Andrew’s passion for motorsport began in the mud of his native Northern Ireland, 
where he raced quad bikes as a teenager. He developed an innovative suspension 
system for his quad in a subsequent A-Level project and then went on to read 
mechanical engineering at Queens University, Belfast.. (“Andrew Murdoch, Williams 
Martini Racing” 2016) 
 
For Ron Dennis, Chairman of McLaren 
I was always fascinated by anything mechanical. I was an avid user of Meccano, had 
my train set, built plastic kits of villages. I remember my brother taking me to a 
Boxing Day meeting at Brands Hatch and being impressed by a formule libre single-
seater with a big V8 engine. But it was the creativity of making things that drove me, 
not wanting to be a racing driver. While I was still at school I spent my weekends 
hanging around the Brabham workshop at Byfleet, and eventually persuaded them to 
let me make the tea and sweep the floor, just to get close to the cars. (quoted in 
Harmer 2012) 
Or for Rob Marshall, Chief Technical Officer of Red Bull,  
Rob developed a passion for machinery early in life, prompted in large part by his 
father's work and interests: "My father was also an engineer and worked for a 
company that made paper-making machines. He had a lathe, so we were always 
building bits and pieces”. (“Rob Marshall, Red Bull Racing” 2016) 
We can be more precise about the nature of these trajectories (see Table 2). In six cases 
(trajectory 1) an early career as driver provides an entrée into the industry. Sometimes, as 
with Fernley, this was part of a distinctive racer-mechanic trajectory, though in other cases, 
as with Niki Lauda, drivers came from privileged backgrounds. Leaving aside these drivers, 
we see only three cases of this F1 elite being able to pursue an engineering route without a 
university degree (route 6).  
 
Career type Names  
1. Experience as driver 
provides entrée into F1 
Lauda, Wolff, Horner, Williams, Symonds, Fernley 
2. Academic engineering 
route (undergrad/ masters) 
F1/ motorsport only 
Lowe, Cowell, Costa, Newey, Fallows, Monaghan, 
Smedley, Somerville, Murdoch, Edolls, Head, Boullier, 
Goss, Morris, Prodromou, Michael, Szafnauer 
3. Academic engineering 
route (undergrad/ masters) 
– brief experience outside 
F1, always in engineering 
Willis, Marshall, Burns, Neale, Oatley, Roberts, 
Whitmarsh, Mayer, Chester 
4. Academic engineering 
route (PhD) into F1 
Bell, Wache, Wood 
5. Academic professional 
route 
O’Driscoll, Parr  
6. Apprentice/ other 
technical route 
Brawn, Dennis, Redding 
7. Business route Mateschitz, Claire Williams, Lopez, Gastaldi, Carter, 
Roy Sahara, Mallya 
Unclear/ insufficient data Hennel, Green, Stevenson 
 
It is true that there is a very clear ‘norm’ where the most senior staff rarely have a 
background outside the industry, and mostly have engineering or design specialisms. Where 
they have worked outside F1, it is nearly always in related sectors – motor sport, automotive 
or aeronautical. Table 2 shows clearly that the dominant career route is the academic 
engineering route combined with long service in the industry. 29 of the 50 have backgrounds 
in academic engineering (types 2,3,4) sometimes extending to doctorates.  
This pattern conforms to the understanding of industry advisors. Interestingly, Jenkins et al 
(2009) argue, ‘people in senior positions at Formula 1 teams typically have not been business 
school graduates or professional managers’. According to Pat Symonds at Williams, they 
have been ‘without exceptions, people like myself, professional engineers who have been in 
the business a long while, but not managers. And in common with most Formula 1 teams, we 
don’t have trained managers; you won’t find any MBAs here’ (quoted in Jenkins et al 2009). 
What is also striking is the type of universities that this engineering elite (in clusters 2, 3 and 
4) attended. Although there are some figures who benefited from engineering degrees at elite 
universities such as Cambridge and Imperial (Paddy Lowe, Geoffrey Willis), the modal 
pattern is for these staff to be recruited from engineering programmes in the classic industrial 
towns (such as Birmingham, Cardiff, Manchester, and Southampton)4. The F1 elite might be 
seen as an extension therefore of the older industrial model, the contemporary manifestation 
of old industrial/craft traditions. A further twist along these lines is that only a minority went 
to university in London and the South East. 15 went to university in the Midlands, the North, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland. This pattern of university attendance does not conform the 
gilded norm of Oxbridge consecration and suggests a more diverse and technical background.   
These patterns of university attendance are not typically ‘academic’ profiles. Instead they are 
associated with the idiom of ‘passion’ and ‘getting the bug’, where entry to university comes 
after initial interests in motor sport and engineering. They have a habitus associated with 
motor sports, i.e. not global exchangeable skills but highly specific and focused expertise. 
Most of the elite have a strong interest in engineering or mechanics (or, though often at a later 
date, racing) from young age. They commit their leisure time to pursuing these hobbies and 
are often willing to work lowly jobs in garages or at the race track for free (Ladbrooke 2013). 
It follows that this elite is highly networked amongst each other. They have intense social 
capital and networks arising from years in the industry (and related industries). This 
accumulation of social capital engenders success. Smith (2012) discusses responses in F1 to 
innovation and change, which he refers to as ‘technological discontinuities’. So called 
‘competence enhancing’ discontinuities involve technologies which build on existing 
techniques, know-how and an established knowledge base (Smith 2012, 334). ‘Competence-
destroying’ technological discontinuities, on the other hand, occur with the introduction of 
technologies that are so fundamentally different from existing ones that much of the 
accumulated expertise that has been built up over many years rapidly becomes obsolete 
(334). In his discussion of one such competence-destroying discontinuity – ‘something that is 
comparatively rare even in a technology-led sector like Formula 1’ – Smith shows that the 
designer John Barnard was able to revolutionise chassis technology by making the leap to 
carbon fibre because of his accumulated social capital. Barnard had a large and eclectic 
network of leading designers and team owners in F1, contacts in aeronautics and other 
motorsport industries, and other categories of racing that were technologically and 
geographically distant from F1. Able to draw on these contacts for knowledge, he thus gave 
his team, McLaren, a stark advantage over a rival, Lotus, who were also pursuing carbon 
fibre, but through methods borrowed directly from the existing aluminium chassis technology 
(Smith 2012: 336, 346). 
 
6: Conclusion 
Pulling together the threads of this paper, we make three major points. Firstly, and most 
descriptively, we have extended the sociological gaze to bring into view a technical elite, at 
the forefront of a successful and dynamic industry, yet which we have also argued needs to 
be understood historically and is not readily captured by current sociological motifs. At the 
apex of all the British teams we see a distinctive crystallisation of a technical habitus, 
strongly embedded in the industry, and exemplifying intense passions and dedications.  
This descriptive point is important but we want to make two further analytical points on the 
back of it. Secondly, we have deliberately sought to problematize any clear categorical 
distinction between a distinctive elite and non-elite formation. Or, to put this another way, we 
need to see elite formation as bound up with wider processes affecting the upper levels of the 
social structure and not simply a small 1% or some such. Excavating this group takes us away 
from the very small ‘super-rich’ towards a more messy assemblage of an ‘elite constellation’. 
This has the further implication of disrupting a certain populist discourse which pits a small 
group at the top against a large majority.  In fact, privilege and accumulation stretch well into 
the ranks of the upper middle classes.  
In elaborating this emphasis on an elite constellation, we argue for the significance of time 
and accumulation. Here we seek to disrupt the ‘human capital’ discourse which lies behind a 
narrow meritocratic view which might justify large rewards. Reframing this within a wider 
recognition of accumulation on Bourdieu’s and Piketty’s model means instead that human 
capital only signifies within a wider ecology in which specific skills and capacities come to 
earn rewards. In Bourdieusian terms, we need to recognise the institutionalised and 
objectified, as well as embodied qualities which are implicated in forms of accumulation. 
This is why we have tried to bring out how the technical elite are in a certain way embedded 
within the industry itself, and to understand their advantages we need to place them within 
this wider historical and spatial context. Elites are thereby constituted through long term 
processes of accumulation. Making this point shifts argument away from debates about 
human capital, and high salaries and bonuses being a just reward for endeavour within spot-
markets. It focuses attention on wider historical processes by which an entire ecology comes 
to prize and funnels certain capacities and skills. This is where Kluge and Negt’s insistence 
on historical obstinacy – even in these neo-liberal and global times – is so important.  
The accumulation emphasis helps in a further analytical way. It makes us realise that the most 
advantaged are not categorically different from other social groups, who also draw on certain 
kinds of capital, but instead should be understood as those who can maximise such 
advantages. Economically, as Piketty has shown, the return to capital increases 
proportionately as one’s total amount of capital increases. This generates non-linear or outlier 
effects at the top within the context of ‘winner take all markets’.  
																																																													
1 Despite the Britishness of the industry and its workforce, with 7 of the 11 teams and 14 of the 30 Formula One 
Group companies being located in the UK, figures relating to the F1 industry are typically quoted in US dollars 
reflecting the international operation of its finances and sponsorship. The GBP figures here are approximations 
calculated at the exchange rate as of January 2016. 
2 Of course this point is qualified by employment law, including certain rights to dismissal procedures, 
redundancy and the like but this does not alter the fundamental point.  
3 Street circuits, while cheaper initially than building a permanent race circuit, have higher annual costs in the 
region of $55 million (plus the average hosting fee of $26 million, which is subject to a yearly 10% increase). 
4 University attendance can be grouped as follows: Oxbridge/Golden triangle 10; Overseas 6; old 
industrial/technical redbricks and civics 15; plateglass 1; new universities 3 
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